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JUDICIAL NOTICE IN THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 2-01: Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195
(1969)
Article II, Rule 2-01, of the preliminary draft of the federal
Proposed Rules of Evidence' provides for the "judicial notice of facts
in issue or facts from which they may be inferred."2 The rule is built
on the definitions provided by the caption and subsections (b) and (g):
Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts:
(b) KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact must be either (I)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not
subject to reasonable dispute.
(g) INSTRUCTING JURY. In civil jury cases, the judge shall instruct the
jurN to accept as conclusive any facts judicially noticed. In criminal jury
cases, the judge shall instruct the jury that it may but is not required to
accept as conclusive any fact that is judicially noticed2
The Proposed Rule is not a drastic departure from previous
academic proposals such as the Model Code of Evidence and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence.' Nonetheless, only the legislatures of
I Rule 2-01. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts:
(a) ScoPE OF RULE. This rule governs judicial notice of facts in issue or facts from
which they may be inferred.
(b) KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact must be either (I) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, so
that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute.
Ic) WHEN DISCRETIONARY. A judge or court shall take judicial notice if requested by
a party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter to be noticed.
(f) Ti\iE OF TAKING NOTICE. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) INSTRUCTING JURY. In civil jury cases, the judge shall instruct the jury to accept
as conclusive any facts judicially noticed. In criminal jury cases, the judge shall instruct
the jury that it may but is not required to accept as conclusive any fact that is judicially
noticed.
Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161. 195-96 (1969).
2 Id at 95
3 Id at 195-96,
4 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE ch. 9 (1942); UNiFORi RULES OF EVIDENCE II (1953).
Subseci un (a) of the Proposed Rule is the section which does not have a counterpart in the
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California 5 and Kansas6 have attempted to provide the courts with the
kind of general guidelines found in the Model Code and Uniform
Rules. Other state statutes simply list subjects of which the courts may
take judicial notice.7 For example, North Dakota lists 92 items.'
Georgia's statute illustrates the opposite extreme, containing only a
short paragraph of generalizations? Federal legislation dealing with
judicial notice also has been limited,"° and even federal case law does
not clearly define its limits." The Proposed Rule attempts to bring
some uniformity to federal decisions by providing general guidelines for
the kinds of facts of which courts may take notice.'2
The most controversial portions of the Proposed Rule are its
limitation to adjudicative facts, and the disputable-indisputable
standards of subsections (b) and (g). The first limits the kinds of facts
subject to the statutory requirements of the Proposed Rule. The second
settles a long-standing controversy and determines whether adjudicative
facts which are judicially noticed may be subject to rebuttal.
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts in a particular case as applied
to the parties involved . 3 Legislative facts, on the other hand, are facts
which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment in developing law or
Model Code or Uniform Rules and it is intended only as a definition of the scope of the rule.
The Proposed Rule differs in that it does not require the party seeking judicial notice to notify
the other party. However, the parties still have an opportunity to be heard under the Proposed
Rule. Subsection (f) of the Proposed Rule, which allows notice to be taken at any time, is an
innovation of the advisory committee and clarifies an area that was not specifically dealt with
by the Model Code or Uniform Rules. Subsection (g) is comparable to Model Code rule 805 and
Uniform Rules rule 11 which are labeled "Instructing the Trier of Fact." However, the Proposed
Rule differs in that it specifies, at least in civil trials, that facts judicially noticed are conclusive
upon the jury while not conclusive in criminal trials.
5. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 450-60 (Deering 1966).
6. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-409 (1964).
7. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 48a (Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:422 (1967); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.44 (Page 1954).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-10-02 (1960).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-112 (1954).
10. Congress provides for judicial notice of material printed in the Federal Register, 44
U.S.C. § 1507 (Supp. IV. 1968); official seals of various governmental agencies, e.g., 10
U.S.C. § 8011 (1964), 13 U.S.C. § 3 (1964), 26 U.S.C. § 7514 (1964); and extortionate credit
transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 891(9) (Supp. IV. 1968).
11. It is generally recognized that courts can take notice of facts which are common knowledge.
See. e.g., Fox v. City of west Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1967); Application of
Knapp-Monarch Co., 296 F.2d 230, 232 (C.C.P.A. 1961); United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec.
Co., 215 F. Supp. 532, 542-43 (D.C. Kan. 1963).
12. Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195 (1969).
13. See Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195, 200 (1969); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 687, 710 (1954); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLIM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
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policy." By captioning the Proposed Rule "Judicial Notice of
Adjudicative Facts," the advisory committee explicitly incorporated
the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts into Rule 2-
01,15 though neither the Model Code nor the Uniform Rules make this
distinction." The Proposed Rule, then, applies strictly to notice of
adjudicative facts. It supplies no guidelines for the notice of legislative
facts. Since the advisory committee felt that there are "fundamental
differences between adjudicative facts and legislative facts, 1' 7 it felt
that the requirement imposed upon noticed adjudicative facts would be
unworkable and undesirable if imposed upon notice of legislative
facts.' " Under the Proposed Rule, then, courts may continue noticing
legislative facts as in the past.
14. See Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 196 (1%9); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55
COLUm L REV. 945, 952 (1955). The practical difference between adjudicative and legislative
facts is that adjudicative facts must be supported by evidence but the findings or assumptions of
islative facts need not and often cannot be supported by evidence. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55
COLUm L. REV. 945, 952-53 (1955). In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349
(1953), the Court articulated the distinction between adjudicative and legislative or "non-
evidence" facts when it said, "... in devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record
of a particular proceeding."
Courts have often used extra-record facts or assumptions to support their findings. See
generally Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation of the races in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon Negro children); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (judicial noice of the ascendency of Communist doctrines); United States v. Butler, 297
U S. 1 (1936) (agricultural dislocation termed "a widespread similarity of local conditions");
Durham v United States, 214 F,2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (medico-legal writers presented
"convincing evidence" of a different approach for an insanity test).
A category of "constitutional facts" has emerged in constitutional cases distinguishing between
these facts and adjudicative facts. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Admimstraut, Process, 55 HARV L. REV 364, 403 (1942). Davis cites for support in his article
Borden's Farm Products, Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934) and Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan. 264 UJ S. 504, 520 (1924).
It is also considered appropriate that a court not be limited to formal evidence in its
determination of matters of law. The judge must determine law consistently with determination
in other irnilar cases, McNaughton, Judicial \ottce- Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-
Wigmore Controversl 14 VAND. L REv 779, 787, 791 (1961).
15 The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is one which was first drawn by
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. He explains this classification by pointing out that adjudicative
facts concern "'ho did sshat, wshere, when. how. and w.ith what motive or intent" while legislative
facts are those "which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment .. " Davis, Judicial Notice,
55 CoLuLL. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955); Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administratie Process, 55 HARV. L. REv 364, 402-03 (1942).
16 Professor Davis criticizes the Model Code and Uniform Rules for failing to recognize that
courts go beyond the record for facts about the parties and their activities. Davis, Judicial Notice,
55Coum L REV. 945,946 (1955).
17 Proposed Rule of Evidence, 46 F.R.D 161, 195, 196 (1969).
18 Sceid at 198.
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Because courts have no statutory guidelines when taking notice of
legislative facts under the Proposed Rule, the threshold question is
whether a fact is adjudicative or legislative. To use an historical
illustration, the court may have to decide whether segregation of the
races in public schools has a detrimental psychological effect upon
Negro children. 9 The Proposed Rule provides no standard for making
this threshold determination. Simply because the advisory committee
points out in its commentary that there are differences between the two
types of facts is no reason why a standard should not be formally
established for determining when a fact is adjudicative or when it is
legislative.
The effect of the disputability of judicial notice of fact usually has
been considered within the Morgan-Wigmore dichotomy." On one side,
Professors Morgan and McNaughton contend that the primary
purpose of judicial notice is to prevent unnecessary litigation of moot
questions of fact. 21 Therefore, notice should be confined to patently
indisputable questions of fact. 2 Further, since the matter noticed is
indisputably true, it should not be allowed to be controverted and is
thus conclusive upon the jury.23 McNaughton views the issue as:
"[a]ssuming that it is proper to take judicial notice of information
central to what is called the factual component of a determination of
liability or remedy, may the prejudiced party rebut the judge's
determination by formal evidence tendered to the trier of fact?"24 The
advisory committee, in agreement with Morgan and McNaughton,
answers in the negative. 25
However, Wigmore and Thayer argue that, for the sake of
convenience, a judge additionally may notice facts which are unlikely
to be challenged as well as those which are patently indisputable. 26 If
19. See note 14, supra.
20. See McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan- Wiginore
Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779 (1961); Note, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial
Notice, 13 VILL. L. REV. 528, 534 (1968).
21. See note 20, supra.
22. See McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigniore
Controversy. 14 VAND. L. REv. 779 (1961); Morgan, Judicial Notice. 57 HARv. L. REv. 269,
279 (1944).
23. See note 22, supra.
24. McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy.
14 VAND. L. REv. 779, 795 (1961). For various answers to the issue as stated by McNaughton,
see cases and statutes id. at 796-805 n.3.
25. Subsection (g) states that the jury shall be instructed to accept as conclusive any judicially
noticed facts. Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195-96 (1969).
26. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 308-09 (1898); J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2571 (3rd ed. 1940).
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the opponent believes that the matter is disputable, he may offer
evidence to that effect? This is basically the "disputables" approach.
Judicial notice then operates much as a presumption because the
opponent may attempt to persuade the jury to find the noticed fact
untrue3'
In resolving the controversy over disputable-indisputable standards,
subsection (b) of the Proposed Rule would standardize the federal
courts into so-called "indisputable" jurisdictions by allowing an
adjudicative fact to be noticed only when it is "not subject to
reasonable dispute"" or, in other words, indisputable. This seems to
apply to facts which are "generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court"3 and to facts "capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned."'" A logical extension of subsection (b) is
subsection (g) which provides that once a fact is noticed under
subsection (b), a civil jury is instructed to accept the noticed fact as
conclusive.3 2
The Proposed Rule's "indisputables" limitation is consistent with
a majority of federal cases33 although there are times when judges deem
it proper to notice matters which are not clearly indisputable.34 It
27 9 J VIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2567(a) (3rded. 1940).
28 S'c McNaughton, Judicial Votice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore
(ontr,cr~v, 14 \AND. L. REV 779 (1961); Note, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial
Vooic. 13 \'ILL L. REX'. 528, 536 (1968). Morgan opposes the "disputables" view and the
underlying presumption it establishes. He contends that if taking judicial notice of a matter means
that it is indisputable, then it must follow that no evidence to the contrary is admissible. If the
evidencc i\ admissible, then Morgan reasons that the basis for judicial notice is only convenience
and not a prohibition against moot issues. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REV. 269, 279
(1944)
29 Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F. R D 161. 195 (1969). Professor Davis establishes a more
detailed criteria than the phrase, "not subject to reasonable dispute" by contending that judges
must be given a wide range of discretionary power.
The principal variables are (a) whether the facts are close to the center of the controversy
betveen the parties or whether they are background facts at or near the periphery, (b)
whether they are adjudicative or legislative facts, and (c) the degree of certainty or
doubt whether the facts are certainly indisputable, probably indisputable, probably
debatable or certainly debatable.
Davis. Judikial Notice, 55 COLUM. L REV 945, 977 (1955).
30. Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195 (1969).
31 Id
32 Id
33 S,.c c iZ- Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Lisco v. MeNichols, 208
l- Supp. 471,478 (D.C. Colo. 1962).
34 ce. eg t, Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937); Gleaton
v Green, 156 F.2d 459, 462 (4th Cir. 1946); Alexander v. Corey, 98 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Alas 1951)
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appears that federal law would be changed in this respect by making
judicially noticed facts not only indisputable but conclusive upon juries
in civil trials. 5 On the other hand, a criminal jury is instructed only
that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive although
no rebuttal is allowed .3
Limiting judicial notice to those facts which are clearly indisputable
unduly restricts the rule. It may prevent notice when a disputable issue
is not central to* the case, thus reducing its usefulness by complicating
records. Courts ought to take notice of facts which may be subject to
some dispute if they are not crucial in order to speed the conduct of
the trial and lessen jury confusion.
Moreover, if the court mistakenly notices a fact which would
otherwise be subject to reasonable dispute, it inadvertently deems the
fact indisputable simply because of binding instructions upon the jury.
Therefore, the refusal of the court to allow rebuttal evidence may be
contrary to the rationale of the adversary system.37 To the contrary, it
has been argued that the "disputables" approach keeps the adversary
nature of the proceeding substantially intact by testing the propriety of
noticed facts.ss This seems to 'pose a major problem with the Proposed
Rule particularly in criminal cases. Since the opponent of the noticed
fact is not allowed rebuttal, a possible conflict with the sixth
amendment's right to trial by jury may arise when the jury is not
allowed to weigh alternatives. 9 Even though the noticed fact is not
binding upon the criminal jury, the opponent is not allowed access to
the jury. Nevertheless, subsection (g) is not subject to attack unless the
standard of indisputability of subsection (b) is rejected since (g) is
basically an extension of (b).
Under the Proposed Rule, trials could be shortened and,
consequently, trial backlogs decreased. Yet trials also can be
conveniently processed using a "disputables" method since it is not
likely that much of the noticed material would be challenged. It seems
that a longer trial in the instances in which an opposing party wants
35. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937).
36. Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 195-96 (1969).
37. See Timson v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 119 S.W. 565 (1909) where
the Missouri Supreme Court held that if the question can be disputed, then evidence so disputing
it should be admitted. See generally Note, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice,
13 VILL. L. REv. 528, 552-56 (1968) for interesting procedural discussions.
38. See note 37, supra.
39. For an interesting constitutional argument, see Note, The Presently Expanding Concept of
Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REv. 528, 542-43 (1968).
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to challenge a judicially noticed fact does not justify preventing a jury
from considering the truth of offered evidence. Further, it appears
appropriate to require the party advocating judicial notice of legislative
facts at least to establish that adequately informed men, such as a
legislator, might reasonably believe in the actuality of a condition
which prompted action such as legislation. 0 This type of standard
would help insure the accuracy of the factual proposition.
40. Svc J MAGUIRE, EviDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 171-74 (1947) where the
author discusses the use of the -Brandeis brief."
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